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OIL AND GAS LEASE

Oil and gas lease issues received considerable attention from Kansas courts during the past year. The most surprising ruling concerned
the "free gas" clause.
t David E. Pierce is a professor at the Washburn University School of Law in
Topeka, Kansas.
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The "Free Gas" Clause Surprise

From a lessee's perspective, the most shocking decision during the
2010-2011 time frame is Schell v. OXY USA, Inc. where the court
held a "free gas" clause required the lessee to provide its lessors with
"usable" free gas.' The case was filed as a class action comprised of
"[a]ll surface owners of Kansas land burdened by oil and gas leases
held or operated by OXY USA, Inc., which contain a free gas
clause." 2 OXY had sent letters to its free gas users alerting them that
the wells supplying free gas in the Hugoton Gas Field were declining
in pressure to such an extent that the available gas supply may be
disrupted in the future. OXY also alerted its free gas users that some
of its wells were beginning to generate high levels of hydrogen sulfide.
OXY "'strongly encourage[d] [plaintiffs] to convert [their] residence[s] to an alternative energy source as soon as possible.'"
The Schell case demonstrates the sort of conflicts that can arise in a
gas field in decline where prudent operational choices to maximize
continuing production from the field may, of necessity, conflict with
the ability to continue providing free gas to a surface owner. In Schell,
however, the court addressed the intermediate question of which
party-surface owner or lessee-must incur additional costs to provide
free gas when it is still available, albeit at a pressure or quality that
will require the expenditure of money to make it "usable" as it is produced at the wellhead. 4 This intermediate question, OXY contended,
was clearly addressed by the terms of its oil and gas leases.
One of the free gas clauses interpreted by the court provides:
[L]essor to have gas free of charge from any gas well on the leased
premises for stoves and inside lights in the principal dwelling house
on said land by making his own connections with the well, the use of
such gas to be at the lessor's sole risk and expense.'
OXY contended that the express terms of this clause imposed the
"sole risk and expense" associated with taking free gas on the lessor,
not the lessee.6
1. Schell v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 07-1258-JTM, 2011 WL 4553091 (D. Kan. Sept.
29, 2011). Disclosure Note: The author served as an expert witness for OXY USA
Inc. at the class certification stage of this case.
2. Id. at *3 (quoting Schell v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 07-1258-JTM, 2009 WL
2355792, at *6 (D. Kan. July 29, 2009)). In Kansas the right to free gas is a covenant
that runs with the surface estate. Jackson v. Farmer, 594 P.2d 177, 182 (Kan. 1979).
3. Id. at *2 (quoting Dkt. No. 87, Exs. G & H).
4. Id. at *5 (noting that "OXY does not dispute that it must continue to provide
plaintiffs free gas for the duration of the leases. The dispute in this case is whether,
based on the language of the leases, OXY must bear the cost of making the gas useable to the surface owners at the well or whether plaintiffs must bear that cost.").
5. Id. at *8 (quoting Dkt. No. 92, Exs. A-C).
6. Id. at *5 ("Defendants contend the plaintiffs are entitled only to free gas as it
emerges from the well, whatever its condition.").
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In all cases, the gas was taken at or near the wellhead in the field
where the gas was extracted. One of the "risks" associated with gas in
the field is geology-the gas may have a low heating value, may contain
liquid hydrocarbon components that make it more difficult to use,
may contain hydrogen sulfide, or may be at such a pressure that compression is required, which can interfere with taking free gas from the
well. The court acknowledged these realities but nevertheless held
that the express terms of the lease, which stated that gas can be used
for "stoves and inside lights in the principal dwelling," obligated the
lessee to deliver gas to the lessor that is "usable."' In the court's view,
"usable" meant usable for residential purposes.8
The court's analysis turned what has been consistently held to be a
"quantity" restriction into a "quality" obligation. The "stoves and inside lights in the principal dwelling" language is a limitation on what
the gas can be used for and therefore a quantity limitation. The "quality" issue was clearly addressed by the simple fact that the gas was
being delivered to the surface owner at or very near the wellhead in its
as-produced condition. The court misapplied the "sole risk and expense" language by holding it only applied after the gas was put into a
usable condition.' Because the surface owner is taking gas as it
emerges from the wellhead, the major purpose of the "sole risk and
expense" language is to ensure the lessee is not responsible for the
non-residential quality of the gas. Equally important, if the choice becomes one of continuing the economic production of gas from the well
over being able to provide free gas, that too is one of the fundamental
"risks" associated with the free gas clause. The court took a fundamentally different view: "Interpreting the lease to require OXY only
to provide gas, whether it is useable or not, would frustrate the entire
purpose of the free gas clause.""o The court, in order to provide the
surface owner with an unimpeded supply of residential quality gas,
chose instead to "frustrate the entire purpose" of the oil and gas lease.
The court's holding functionally makes every Kansas gas producer
providing free gas a public utility with a continuing duty to serve its
"customers" in the field with the same quality gas one would expect
within a city from their local gas distribution utility. The court ignores
the context of the oil and gas lease contract and elevates the obligation to provide free gas to a new tail-wags-dog status. The court
places providing free gas to a severed surface owner in a superior position over that of the lessor mineral owners who-if put to the
choice-would select maximizing production over incidental free gas
7. Id. at *7-8 (finding "the leases here providing for 'free gas' are ambiguous as
to what quality of gas plaintiffs are entitled to receive" and that such ambiguities
"should be construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee.").
8. Id. at *8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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rights. The court avoids this choice by imposing the obligation on the
lessee to provide "usable" gas at lessee expense. Whether the lessee
deducts this post-production expense before calculating royalty, the
obligation will most likely have a profound effect on the lessor mineral owners. For example, a prudent lessee, in determining whether to
institute a program that will enhance production from a well, will certainly consider what it will cost to maintain the surface owner's newfound free gas rights. These additional costs may cause the prudent
lessee to rightfully forego production-enhancing improvements that
they would otherwise pursue.
In its attempt for equity by providing surface owners with a continuing supply of free gas, the court created an inherent conflict between
the free gas clause and the underlying purpose of the oil and gas lease,
which is to maximize production of oil and gas for the lessor and
lessee. Prior to the Schell decision, a reasonable interpretation of a
free gas clause would be that a surface owner was only entitled to gas
as it emerged from the well as an incidental benefit of the oil and gas
development process. The free gas user assumed the risk associated
with the condition of the gas and the risk that it may not be practical
at some future date to provide free gas while continuing to extract the
remaining gas resource from a dying reservoir.
B. Is the Kansas "Conservation Fee" a "Production"Cost? Yes.
Kansas, like many states, imposes a tax on the production of oil and
gas to help fund the state's oil and gas conservation agency. It is
called a "conservation fee" and is levied on the "operator" of the
well," which is defined as "a person who is responsible for the physical operation and control of a well . . . ."1' The Kansas Supreme
Court, in Hockett v. Trees Oil Co., held that because Hockett, as the
lessor/royalty owner, could not be an "operator," the burden of the
tax fell solely on the lessee/operator." The Court rejected the lessee's
argument that the oil and gas lease contemplated the lessor would
share in a proportionate part of the tax, noting that the tax was not
enacted until forty-five years after the lease was signed.14 Responding
to the lessee's argument that the tax was a deductible post-production
cost, the Court held "the conservation fee is more akin to a production cost."". Although the production purchaser is used to collect and
remit the tax to the state, the amount of the tax will have to be added
back into the net proceeds the producer receives to calculate the
proper royalty.
11. Act of Apr. 13, 2011, ch. 53, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws, sec. 20 (amending
§ 55-176).
12. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-150(e) (2005).
13. Hockett v. Trees Oil Co., 251 P.3d 65, 70 (Kan. 2011).
14. Id. at 71-72.
15. Id. at 72.

KAN.

STAT. ANN.
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Must the Lessee Add Back Severance Taxes
Attributable to Helium? No.

The lessor in Hockett v. Trees Oil Co. also argued that the severance
taxes paid by the lessee were improper because an unspecified part of
the tax paid was attributed to the helium content of the gas streamand helium is not subject to the severance tax.16 The Court noted that
the lessor "does not challenge that the severance tax applies to royalty
owners."" This is understandable since the statutes impose the severance tax on all owners," "including a royalty owner."1 9 However, the
tax is based on the value of the gas at the wellhead, not at a downstream location following extraction and processing of the helium.
The Court observed that the Kansas Department of Revenue, in a
1998 Revenue Ruling, held that "since helium is a component of natural gas and is measured as part of the full volume of gas as it is severed, helium contributes to the gross value of gas at the wellhead,
making helium subject to the severance tax."2 0 Under these circumstances, the lessor's petition failed to state a viable claim against its

lessee. 2 1
D.

The Kansas "Paying Quantities" Analysis

Prior Kansas cases have suggested that when determining whether a
lease continues to produce in "paying quantities," certain "costs" can
be attributed to the lessee's operations even though they were not in
fact paid or contracted for as a legal obligation. The foundational case
on the subject is Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, where the Court
noted the practical problem of dealing with a lessee who "came to the
trial prepared to testify about everything except operating expenses." 2 2 To counter this tactic, or reality of how the lessee conducts
its business, the Court armed the lessor with the ability to come into
court and demonstrate what the lessee should have spent to operate
the lease as a prudent operator by ruling that:
[T]he lessee is held accountable for the production of the lease as a
prudent operator working for the common advantage of both the
lessor and the lessee. All direct costs encountered, whether paid or
16. Id. at 68 ("[H]e believes there is no statutorily imposed severance tax on the
helium component of the extracted gaseous product.").
17. Id.
18. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-4217 (Supp. 2009) (imposing an 8% excise tax on the
severance and production of oil and gas on "all persons within the term 'producer' . . .
in proportion to their respective beneficial interest in the . . . oil or gas severed.").

19. Id. § 79-4216(i) (defining "producer" under the tax).
20. Hockett, 251 P.3d at 69.
21. Disclosure Note: Although not involved in the Hockett case, the author is
involved in other litigation, as a consultant or designated expert, retained by producers defending against similar helium severance tax and other royalty claims.
22. Reese Enters., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 898 (Kan. 1976).
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accrued, in operating the lease as a prudent operator are taken into
account.23
The Court in Reese considered many items of expenses the lessee and
the trial court failed to consider. For example, a mileage charge for
driving to and from the lease and the cost of complying with statutory
obligations to plug at least fifteen abandoned wellbores on the leased
land plus the associated obligation to level and restore the well sites
following abandonment.2 4 Once the Court attributed these expenses
to the prudent operation of the lease, total expenses exceeded the revenue during the defined accounting period so the lease had automatically terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities.2 5
The court in Wrestler v. Colt faced similar issues where the lessee's
evasive statement of costs resulted in an $11 profit over its declared
operating expenses. 26 Holding the lease had terminated, the court observed the lessee's calculations failed to assign amounts to "taxes, license and permit fees, maintenance and repair of roads, entrances and
gates, and other expenses described by Colt as 'little items."' 2 7 The
court also found that no costs had been allocated to plugging any of
the forty-nine non-producing wells located on the lease.2 8
The most recent case addressing these paying quantity issues is Claiborne v. Galemore.2 9 Like the Reese and Wrestler cases, the lessor
sought to present evidence as to what it would have actually cost a
prudent operator to operate the lease at issue. The lessee's calculations indicated the lease had a $17,046.05 profit. 0 Once the lessor,
through expert testimony, attributed travel, labor, and plugging expenses to the operation, it added an additional $27,300 in expenses to
the operation resulting in a $10,253.95 loss and a terminated lease.
The Kansas approach to paying quantities behooves lessees to
maintain good records and take the opportunity to allocate costs, as
would a prudent operator. For example, regarding plugging costs and
other expenditures that arguably should be amortized, a court would
be more likely to accept the lessee's accounting if it is maintained as
23. Id.
24. Id. at 899.
25. Id.
26. Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1347.
29. Claiborne v. Galemore, No. 103,163, 2010 WL 5490736, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2010).
30. Id. at *3.
31. Id. at *2 (noting that Noland, the lessee's expert, testified that "a prudent operator would have devoted a minimum of 2 hours per day, 7 days a week, to operate
the lease, and this did not include the time necessary to travel to and from the
lease."). The court relied upon this statement to reject the lessee's estimate of 3.5
hours per week to operate the lease and accepted Noland's testimony that a prudent
operator would spend 14 hours per week on the lease. The court also added in travel
time and travel expenses. Id. at *3.
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part of its ordinary business practices. Certainly, if a prudent operator
invests to improve a road, gate, or other facilities, and the improvement is reasonably believed to last for longer than one year, for example three years, a current allocation of one-third of the expenseinstead of the entire expense-would most likely be accepted by a
court. Similarly, if there are a large number of unplugged wells on the
lease for which the lessee is the responsible party, negotiating a plugging schedule with the Kansas Corporation Commission can allow the
lessee to spread plugging costs over a longer period of time; an immediate and "current" obligation might be made into a proportionate
obligation over several years. These are the sorts of actions a prudent
operator, nursing along a marginal lease, would take. However, for
lessees who decide to play hide-and-seek with their operating expenses, they run the real risk, as in Claiborne, that even greater expenses could be attributed to them by an expert witness testifying as
to what a prudent operator would have done.
E.

Court Discusses Common-Lessee Issue
Regarding Drainage Claim

The "common-lessee" issue arises when A enters into an oil and gas
lease with X and X also enters into a lease with B who owns adjoining
land. Under the rule of capture, development of the A/X leased land
may indirectly compete with development of the B/X leased land. In
this situation, X is a "common-lessee" of A and B.32 Some courts
have imposed greater duties on X in such cases to provide greater
protection to A, and to B." The Texas Supreme Court has rejected
imposing any greater duty on X.3 4 In Texas, if A complains about
drainage to the B/X tract, X's duty is to do the things a prudent operator would do if they owned only the A/X lease.
In Thoroughbred Associates, L.L.C. v. Kansas City Royalty Co., A

(Kansas City Royalty) under the A/X lease argued that the burden of
proof to establish drainage and the burden of proof that a prudent
operator would protect against drainage should both shift to X (Thoroughbred) because X owned the lease (B/X) on the allegedly draining
32. This "common-lessee" relationship does not arise out of any sort of sinister
plan to gang-up on A or B. Instead, X legitimately wants to control as much acreage
around the areas it plans to drill so it can realize the maximum benefit from its
undertaking.
33. See 5 EUGENE Kuarz, A

TREATISE ON THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS

§ 61.1, at

154-56 (1991).
34. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. 1981) (holding
"Amoco's status as a common lessee does not affect its liability to the Alexanders.").
After surveying the various approaches to the common-lessee issue, the court concluded its opinion stating: "In drainage cases, Texas courts place upon the lessor the
burden to prove that substantial drainage has occurred and that an offset well would
produce oil or gas in paying quantities." Id. at 572.
35. Id. at 570 ("Amoco owed the Alexanders the duty to do whatever a reasonably prudent operator would do if the Alexanders were its only lessor in the field.").
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property.36 The court did not address the issue directly but instead
affirms the trial court's finding that A failed to establish that any
drainage was occurring." Indirectly, however, the court effectively
held that the burden of proof to establish drainage did not shift to X.
The court held the lessor must first carry the burden that drainage is
in fact taking place. Once that is proven, some courts have been
willing to shift the burden of proof to X to prove that although drainage was taking place, a prudent operator under the facts would not
take action to respond to the drainage.39 This is a significant ruling
because both sides presented expert testimony that was in direct conflict on the drainage issue.40 The placement of the burden of proof in
that situation may determine the outcome.
Although Kansas appellate courts have not addressed the commonlessee issue, 41 the Kansas Supreme Court has already aligned itself
with Texas in adopting a "single-lease" analysis. Although labeled the
"independent-duty principle" in Kansas,4 2 it is the equivalent of the
Texas single-lease analysis. Under either test, the inquiry is what a
hypothetical prudent operator would do if they owned only one
lease-the lease at issue (the A/X lease).43 This makes X's ownership
of the B/X lease irrelevant because X's duties to A cannot be impacted, either favorably or unfavorably, by the fact that X also has a
lease with B or any other mineral owner. The truly objective nature
of the prudent operator standard can operate once the single-lease or
independent-duty analysis is applied to an implied covenant issue.

36. Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kan. City Royalty Co., 248 P.3d 758, 770 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2011), pet. for rev. filed Mar. 11, 2011.
37. Id. at 771 ("Here, Kansas City failed in its proof of the necessary predicate-that drainage was occurring at all.").
38. Id. at 770-71.
39. See Seacat v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 561 F. Supp. 98, 104 (D. Kan. 1983) (holding that in a common-lessee situation, once the lessor establishes that substantial
drainage is taking place, the burden of proof will shift to the lessee to show that it
acted as a prudent operator would have under the circumstances).
40. Thoroughbred, 248 P.3d at 771 ("The trial court heard an array of experts and
received a squall, if not a blizzard, of documents on the drainage issue. The testimony
and the paper from each side presented starkly contrasting pictures, one depicting
drainage and the other not.").
41. However, in Culbertson v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 P. 81, 83 (Kan. 1912),
the court seemed to adopt a strict liability approach to drainage by a common lessee.
Subsequent cases have applied, without comment, a traditional prudent operator
analysis to resolve drainage issues. See 1 DAVID E. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS
HANDBOOK § 10.90, at 10-21 to 10-22 (1986).
42. Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 272 (Kan. 2001).
43. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the JurisprudentialUnderpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 10-1, 10-13 to 10-14 (2002).
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BASIC PROPERTY ISSUES: NOTICE TO MINERAL COTENANTS
WHEN PARTITION IS SOUGHT

The Kansas Supreme Court, in McGinty v. Hoosier, refused to revisit an otherwise void judgment by ignoring basic cotenancy law and
adopting a rule that a cotenant can obtain partition by sale of its individual undivided interest without attempting to join all the cotenants.44 The Court noted: "The owners of the remaining 50% of the
mineral interest were not personally served in the action, were apparently not served by publication notice, and did not participate in the
action partitioning the subject tract."45 But the Court upheld the
judgment in partition because the party seeking partition did not purport to sell the 50% interest of the non-joined mineral interest owners.46 The Court applied an indispensable party analysis and found
that the other cotenants need not have been joined because the Court
could not perceive how their property interests would be "adversely
affected by the judgment partitioning the named parties' property
interests.""
The Court's holding failed to recognize many important rights the
non-joined parties gave up by not having an opportunity to participate
in the partition action. First, they lost an opportunity to argue that
partition of any sort should not be granted because it would be, under
the facts, oppressive."8 Second, they were denied their right to argue
that partition in kind should be pursued instead of partition by sale." 9
Third, their rights to acquire the property at its appraised value or to
bid and acquire the entire property at the partition sale were taken
away.o Fourth, had the entire mineral interest been sold as a unit to
one bidder, it may have been bought at a higher price. At the most
fundamental level, the Court failed to recognize that all cotenants had
valuable rights in all the property-as cotenants.
III.
A.

STATUTORY ISSUES

Statutes Regarding Timely Payment of Production Proceeds

In 1991, the Kansas Legislature passed statutes to encourage the
timely distribution of production proceeds by providing for statutory
interest and a means by which interest can be collected, including a
provision for the discretionary award of attorney fees to the prevailing
party.5 ' The statutes are odd in that they do not purport to impose
liability for a failure to timely distribute production proceeds to the
44. See McGinty v. Hoosier, 239 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2010).
45. Id. at 847.

46. Id. at 852.
47. Id.
48. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1003(d) (2005).
49. See id. § 60-1003(c).
50. See id. § 60-1003(c)(4).
51. KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§

55-1614 to 55-1619 (2005).
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owners. Instead, they impose liability for a failure to pay interest associated with a failure to timely distribute production proceeds. The
distinction is important because the Court in Thoroughbred Associates, L.L.C. v. Kansas City Royalty Co. imposed $97,878 in attorney
fees relying upon K.S.A. § 55-1617, which allows a court to grant the
"prevailing party" attorney fees "in a proceeding brought pursuant to

this act." 52
The opinion seems to indicate that fees were recoverable because
Thoroughbred refused to distribute production proceeds attributable
to Kansas City Royalty; the production proceeds payable were dependent, in part, on how the court ruled on various lease interpretation
issues. Nowhere, however, in the "act" to which § 55-1617 speaks is
there any liability imposed on a lessee or other entity for a failure to
timely distribute production proceeds. The only way liability can accrue is for a failure to pay "interest on any payment."5 3 Logically, this
would suggest that there must be some demand for payment of a
stated sum of money as "interest," followed by a refusal to pay, before
§ 55-1617 is triggered. This would also explain why the Kansas statutes do not provide for any excuse for legitimate title disputes. Presumably, the dispute must be resolved followed by a demand for
interest in the event the party seeking interest prevails on the underlying title dispute.
These statutes have only been mentioned tangentially by the court
in Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., where the overriding
royalty owner argued it would be entitled to attorney fees if it prevailed on its underlying claim that its overriding royalty continued in
effect.5 4 In the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion, it noted that the
proper statutory basis for interest was K.S.A. § 55-1614 et seq., but
then, without comment, stated: "The trial court's ruling that attorney
fees should not be allowed is affirmed."" The Court may have been
concluding that until the legitimate dispute was resolved regarding the
continued validity of the overriding royalty, no production revenues
could be paid, and therefore no interest would be due until the Court
entered its order.
The court in the Thoroughbred case assumed a failure to pay production proceeds gives rise to potential liability for attorney fees if the
litigant failed to prevail on its underlying claim. The court held,
"Under K.S.A. 55-1617, a trial court, acting in its 'discretion,' may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a payment
52. Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kan. City Royalty Co., 248 P.3d 758, 773 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2011), pet. for rev. filed Mar. 11, 2011; see also § 55-1617.
53. Id. § 55-1615.
54. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., 969 P.2d 906, 913 (Kan. Ct. App.
1998), rev'd, 1 P.3d 909 (Kan. 2000) (reversing in regard to the continuing burden
created by overriding royalty).
55. Reynolds-Rexwinkle Oil, Inc. v. Petex, Inc., 1 P.3d 909, 921 (Kan. 2000).
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dispute."5 ' This conclusion does not appear to be supported by the
express terms of the statute. Liability for attorney fees arises out of a
failure to pay "interest" on an amount due, and a failure to pay assumes a prior demand for interest that is rejected or disregarded.
B.

Rights in Gas Migrating Beyond Boundaries of
Gas Storage Facility

Through the years, Kansas has had many cases addressing rights in
gas that has been captured, transported from the field where produced, injected into an underground storage facility, and migrated beyond the boundaries of the facility into nearby lands. The problem
may go unnoticed until someone outside the storage facility drills a
productive gas well on their land. Suddenly the focus becomes
whether the well, although beyond the certificated boundaries of the
storage facility, is nevertheless producing gas that has been injected
into the storage facility. The Kansas common law solution to this
problem was simple: the landowner obtained title to any gas produced
from a well properly bottomed on its land, including any migrating
storage gas.58 This common law solution was changed by statute in
1993 when the Kansas Legislature passed a statute stating that gas
injected into an underground storage facility is personal property.
This personal property belongs to the owner of the injected gas while
within the storage facility boundaries.5 9 But if the gas migrates
outside the storage facility boundaries, the ownership becomes qualified: to retain ownership, the injector must prove that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the gas being produced by the questioned
well is storage gas.6 o
Although the statutory response to the migrating gas problem was
drafted and sponsored by gas storage operators, the jurisprudence to
date has not been kind to those operators.6 1 After years of unsuccessful attempts to use the stored-gas statutes to protect its Cunningham
Storage Field from producing gas wells it suspected were impacting its
gas storage operations, Northern Natural Gas Company resorted to
condemnation under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 ("NGA"). The
56. ThoroughbredAssocs., 248 P.3d at 773.
57. See Jacob L. Porter, Note, Underground Fences and Storage Gas Migration:
K.S.A. Section 55-1210 and Legislating Property Rights to Injected Natural Gas, 50
WASHBURN L. J. 177 (2010).
58. See Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Kan. 1985), superseded by statute, Act of Apr. 5, 1993, ch. 102, 1993 Kan. Sess. Laws 294, as recognized
in N. Natural Gas Co. v. Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P., 217 P.3d
966, 974-76 (Kan. 2009) (per curiam). The Anderson Court noted that Texas follows a
different rule that recognizes the gas storage facility owner's continuing rights in the
migrating gas as personal property. Id. at 1030-31 (citing Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 879 (Tex. 1962)).
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1210 (2005).
60. Id. § 55-1210(c) (2005).
61. Porter, supra note 57, at 178, 185-89.
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") granted Northern
certificates of public convenience and necessity to develop and operate the Cunningham underground gas storage facility. The FERC's
certificating authority comes from the NGA.
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres in
Pratt,Kingman, and Reno Counties, Kansas, Northern sought an order

confirming that it had complied with all conditions established by the
FERC-issued certificate to proceed with condemnation.6 2 The major
dispute was whether Northern was required by the NGA to engage in
"good faith negotiations" as a condition to proceeding with condemnation.6 3 The court noted a split in authority on the issue but chose to
follow what it characterized as the majority rule: that the NGA required Northern to make an offer of compensation without any additional requirement that it engage in negotiations regarding the offer.'
The court in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc. had

previously granted an injunction ordering gas well operators within
Northern's proposed expansion area to cease producing their wells
pending completion of condemnation proceedings.6 5 Northern sought
the injunction, asserting that the continued operation of wells within
the proposed condemnation area constituted a nuisance by adversely
impacting the integrity of the Cunningham facility. Northern argued
that continuing to produce water and gas from the wells would aggravate migration of storage gas beyond an underground fault structure
that had previously served to contain the gas within the certificated
facilities. The court found Northern would likely prevail on the merits
of its nuisance claim and that an injunction was necessary to avoid
irreparable harm to Northern's gas storage operations at the Cunningham facility.
IV. CONCLUSION
High oil prices bring new development, which triggers new "oil and
gas law" issues to resolve. With the advent of horizontal drilling in the
Mississippi Lime Formation in Kansas 66 and the payment of large bonuses previously unheard of in the state, everyone will be looking for
"opportunities." In the oil and gas law context, "opportunity" means
finding a potential legal problem others have overlooked. Perhaps
that lease entered into in 1945 really has not been producing in paying
62. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Approx. 9117.53 Acres, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1156-57
(D. Kan. 2011).
63. Id. at 1160.
64. Id. at 1160-62.
65. N. Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1283-84 (D.
Kan. 2010).
66. Rod Walton, River of Opportunity, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 24, 2011, at El,
available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=49&articleid=
2011092449_el cutlin9l9814.
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quantities throughout the past sixty years. Oil and gas law develops
most rapidly as the industry undergoes its inevitable boom-bust cycles.
When the boom is on, no potential fly-in-the-ointment goes unnoticed. Therefore, we can anticipate another collection of interesting
cases when we meet again next year.
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